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Note
Product Configuration Trade Dress and Abercrombie:
Analysis of Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v.
SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd.
Rohit A. Sabnis*
In Ashley Furniture Industries v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd.,1
the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to develop proper
standards for analyzing the inherent distinctiveness of product
configuration trade dress.2  Determining these standards aptly
has been called “one of the most difficult analytical issues in all
of trade dress law.”3  This difficulty, as seen in the Ashley
Furniture case, continues to arise for courts seeking to
determine when the design or features of a product indicate its
source to consumers upon first encounter.  Some courts apply
traditional trademark analysis to product configurations and
point to the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc.4 as strong authority.5  Others find the traditional
analysis inappropriate and have developed their own tests for
inherent distinctiveness.6  As a result, the Circuit Courts of
* J.D. expected May 2001, University of Minnesota Law School. B.S. 1993,
University of California, San Diego.  The author would like to thank the
editors and staff members of the Minnesota Intellectual Property Review for
their assistance and hard work, especially Carl Olson and Kirsten Gullixson.
1. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187
F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999) (Ashley Furniture Industries and SanGiacomo are
manufacturers of home furniture.  See id. at 366.  In the fall of 1995, Ashley
introduced “a neoclassical bedroom suite under the trade name ‘Sommerset.’”
Id. at 367.  In December 1996 or January 1997, SanGiancomo began selling a
line of furniture very similar to the “Sommerset” line.  See id.  Ashley then
brought suit against SanGiacomo for violation of federal trade dress law. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of SanGiacomo.  Ashley
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  See id. at 368.  The Fourth
Circuit held that summary judgment was improper and that the plaintiff's
trade dress could be found inherently distinctive and therefore protectable
from copying.  See id. at 377.).
2. See id.
3. Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
4. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
5. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 370.
6. See id. at 370-72 (describing tests for the inherent distinctiveness of
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Appeals have created divergent standards to which design
producers must tailor their activities to avoid litigation.
The issue raised by the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the
Abercrombie & Fitch7 classifications8 for the analysis of product
configurations in Ashley Furniture raises important concerns
about the proper scope of trade dress law.  Liberal standards
for trade dress protection may improperly grant exclusive
rights to product configurations that do not serve to identify a
producer and distinguish his or her goods in the marketplace.
On the other hand, extremely stringent standards may fail to
grant trade dress protection when a product feature will
immediately indicate source to consumers.  These standards
must also balance an interest in protecting a manufacturer's
source identifying product configuration against the importance
of maintaining a competitive marketplace that allows the
imitation of successful, unpatented designs.  Thus, any decision
to promulgate standards for inherent distinctiveness in this
area of trade dress law has significant ramifications on the
producer of a design and those who wish to capitalize on its
success.
This Comment seeks to use the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Ashley Furniture, along with those of other Circuit Courts of
Appeals, to urge that application of traditional trademark
analysis to product configurations is not required by Supreme
Court precedent and is inappropriate.  Part I establishes the
relevant background of trademark and trade dress law,
Supreme Court decisions, and Circuit Courts of Appeals
decisions that provided the backdrop for the Ashley Furniture
decision.9  Part II describes the holding of the Ashley Furniture
case.10  Finally, Part III analyzes that holding and proposes a
standard for determining the inherent distinctiveness of
product configurations.11
The Comment concludes that the Ashley Furniture court,
like others, has created standards for inherent distinctiveness
that afford overly broad trade dress protection to product
configurations that may produce results incongruent with the
product configurations that do not apply traditional trademark analysis).
7. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d
Cir. 1976).
8. See infra Part I.A (describing the Abercrombie classifications).
9. See infra notes 12-135 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 136-154 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 155-235 and accompanying text.
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purposes of trademark law.  The Comment also concludes that
the correct standard to use when inquiring into inherent
distinctiveness is a less stringent version of the Courts of
Appeals tests rejected in Ashley Furniture.
I. BACKGROUND
A. TRADITIONAL TRADEMARK LAW
United States trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act,12
is an exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause.13  The purpose of the
Act is to “secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish
among competing producers.”14  The intent of the Act also seeks
to make “‘actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks’
and ‘to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition.’”15 Thus, the Lanham Act creates an incentive to
produce quality goods and impedes those who seek to confuse
customers as to the source of a product and benefit from the
goodwill created by another business.16  While Section 3217
protects registered marks, Section 43(a)18 protects qualifying
unregistered trademarks.  This section of the Lanham Act
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. Park' N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985).
15. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767-68 (citing Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1998)).
16. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64
(1995).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1998).
18. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
“Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or
represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter
into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the
falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation
cause or procure the same to be transported or used, shall be liable to
a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely
indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is
situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.”
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
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creates a cause of action against a defendant who uses an
unregistered trademark that causes a likelihood of confusion
among consumers about the source, sponsorship, or approval of
its goods.19
A trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof used by a person . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown.”20  Commonly known marks include the term
“Microsoft” and the Nike swoosh.  Marks such as these are
often classified in the following categories of increasing
distinctiveness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or
fanciful.21  Categories three through five are deemed inherently
distinctive and are entitled to trademark protection because
their “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a
product.”22  These marks are likely to identify the source of a
product “because they have minimal natural or necessary
conceptual connection with the product they mark.”23  The
inherent distinctiveness of these marks is a legal presumption
that they will, upon first encounter by a consumer, serve to
identify and distinguish the source of the product.24
Abercrombie grants immediate and exclusive protection to
these marks because competitors have no substantial need to
access them in order to effectively market their products.25
19. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
21. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
22. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768.  A suggestive mark “requires
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of
goods.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11.  An example of a suggestive
mark might be the use of the word “penguin” to describe an air conditioning
company.  See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 369.  An arbitrary
mark is one that is totally unrelated to the product but well known in other
contexts, for example the use of the word “penguin” in denoting a publishing
company.  See id.  A fanciful mark is totally unrelated to the product but is a
made-up word or mark, for example, a publishing company using a made-up
word like “Penquell.”  See id.
23. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctivness
of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C.L. REV. 471, 486 (1997).
24. See 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.09[1]
(1994).
25. See Chad M. Smith, Undressing Abercrombie: Defining When Trade
Dress Is Inherently Distinctive, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 401, 417
(1998) (describing the varying need for competitors to use marks classified
under Abercrombie's generic, descriptive, and inherently distinctive
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In contrast, generic marks are those that refer “to the
genus of which the particular product is a species” 26 and are not
inherently distinctive.27  Examples of generic terms include
“aspirin”28 and “thermos.”29  These marks are not protectable as
trademarks because they are used in everyday language to
signify a broad “genus” of product and are thus not capable of
identifying a singular product source.30
Marks that serve only a descriptive function in relation to
a product are also not inherently distinctive.31  A descriptive
term identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service
such as its color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients.32
An example of a descriptive mark would include use of the
word “Alo” in reference to products containing gel of the aloe
vera plant.33  When these marks are used only to describe a
product, they do not inherently identify a particular source, and
thus cannot be protected.34  But, over time, a descriptive mark
may acquire distinctiveness that allows it to be protected under
Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act.35  This type of acquired
distinctiveness is called secondary meaning.36  Secondary
meaning is established when a manufacturer shows that, “in
the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product
feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself.”37
Thus, a mark is distinctive and capable of being protected
categories).
26. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.
27. See id.
28. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
29. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577
(2d Cir. 1963).
30. See Michele A. Shpetner, Note, Determining a Proper Test for Inherent
Distinctiveness in Trade Dress, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
947, 961 (1998).
31. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
32. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790
(5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
33. See id.
34. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
35. The Lanham Act provides that a descriptive mark that otherwise
could not be registered under the Act may be registered if it “has become
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1998).
36. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
845 (1982).
37. Id. (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118
(1938)).
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if it is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary
meaning.38  In both cases, the mark identifies and distinguishes
a singular, although possibly anonymous source.
B. TRADE DRESS LAW
Trademarks are defined and expressly protected by the
Lanham Act.  Trade dress, on the other hand, has been
developed by the case law.  Trade dress has been defined to
involve “the total image of a product and may include features
such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”39
Some examples of trade dress held to be protectable
include the festive décor of a restaurant,40 the color of a dry
cleaning pad,41 the packaging of gardening and lawn bottles,42
the packaging of Klondike ice cream bars,43 and the design of a
chair.44  These examples fall within two distinguishable
categories of trade dress, product packaging and product
configuration.45  Product packaging trade dress includes the
total image created by the actual packaging in which a product
is marketed and, similar to a trademark, is conceptually
separable from the product.46  On the other hand, product
configuration trade dress encompasses the design or any
particular features of the product.47  The design of a product,
like the shape of a Ferrari sports car, is not separable from the
product but is a part of the product itself.
Just as with trademarks, trade dress is distinctive and
38. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769.
39. Id. at 764 (citing John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d
966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)).
40. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
41. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163-64.
42. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d
695, 702-04 (5th Cir. 1991).
43. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986).
44. See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
45. See Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product
Configurations and the Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 471, 475 n.15 (1998) (suggesting that product configuration trade dress
may consist of one or a combination of physical features of a product while
product packaging trade dress refers to the packaging that the product is sold
in).
46. See id. at 475.
47. See id.
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capable of being protected under the Lanham Act if it is either
inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through
secondary meaning.48  In addition, the trade dress must be non-
functional.49  The functionality requirement prevents
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by
protecting the goodwill of a source, from inhibiting competition
by granting exclusive rights to a functional product feature.50  It
is the province of patent law to give an inventor a limited
exclusive right to practice the useful, inventive aspects of a
product in exchange for its creation and disclosure to the
public.51  Nevertheless, the patent owner's right to exclude
competition from these product features is not granted without
first satisfying four stringent requirements: the inventor must
show that the invention is useful,52 novel,53 non-obvious,54 and
described in a way that enables others to make and use it.55
The aesthetic functionality doctrine further seeks to
protect competition by recognizing that in some instances non-
useful or decorative product features should be denied trade
dress protection.  Courts have recognized that in some cases,
competitors need to copy strictly decorative product features in
order to be able to compete effectively.56  The Second Circuit
has held that when a decorative or ornamental feature “is
claimed as a trademark and trademark protection would
significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of
adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality
doctrine denies such protection.”57
48. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769-70.
49. See id. at 769.
50. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164.
51. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 150-
51 (1989) (noting that “the federal patent system [ ] embodies a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of . . . advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years”).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
56. See Barrett, supra note 45, at 481.
57. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916
F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990).  The court denied trade dress protection to a
baroque design on silverware.  See id. at 82.  The court found that although
the design patterns did not serve a utilitarian function, granting trade dress
protection would exclude competitors from serving the large market for
baroque style silverware. See id.
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Thus, trade dress law leaves at least one important
question open: Under what circumstances can the features or
design of a product be properly considered inherently
distinctive?  This question remains to be answered directly by
the Supreme Court. The Court's recent decisions in Two Pesos
and Qualitex have shed some light on this issue while creating
confusion among courts trying to answer this question
themselves.
C. THE SUPREME COURT: TWO PESOS AND QUALITEX
1. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Court granted
certiorari “to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the
question of whether trade dress that is inherently distinctive is
protectable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without a
showing that it has acquired secondary meaning.” 58
Two Pesos dealt specifically with the trade dress of a fast
food Mexican restaurant chain that alleged trade dress
infringement under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by a
competing chain that opened restaurants with a similar motif.59
The Fifth Circuit and the District Court ruled that Taco
Cabana's restaurant trade dress was non-functional and
inherently distinctive. These rulings were not in issue at the
Supreme Court level and were assumed to be correct.60  The
Supreme Court held that proof of secondary meaning is not
required for trade dress determined to be inherently
distinctive.61
The Court first sought to find any reasonable basis for
allowing immediate protection for inherently distinctive
trademarks while requiring inherently distinctive trade dress
58. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767.  The split occurred between the Fifth
Circuit in Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659
F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that “trademark law requires a
demonstration of secondary meaning only when the claimed trademark is not
sufficiently distinctive of itself to identify the producer” and that the same
principle should be applied to trade dress) and the Second Circuit in Vibrant
Sales v. New Body Boutique, 652 F.2d 299, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 909 (1982) (holding that Section 43(a) does not protect unregistered
trademarks or designs absent a showing of secondary meaning).
59. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 776.
2000] PRODUCT CONFIGURATION TRADE DRESS 191
to have acquired actual consumer association before receiving
such protection.62  The Court reasoned that since trademarks
and trade dress serve the same statutory purpose of
maintaining the goodwill of a business and preventing
customer confusion, “[t]here is no persuasive reason to apply
different analysis to the two.” 63  The Court also found no
“textual basis in Section 43(a) for treating inherently
distinctive verbal or symbol trademarks differently from
inherently distinctive trade dress.”64  Thus, in reviewing the
Court of Appeals decision in the case, the Court determined
that:
The Fifth Circuit was quite right in Chevron, and in this case, to
follow the Abercrombie classifications consistently and to inquire
whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under § 43(a) is
inherently distinctive.  If it is, it is capable of identifying products or
services as coming from a specific source and secondary meaning is
not required.
65
The Court also discussed the potential negative effects on
competition that could occur if non-descriptive trade dress were
required to acquire secondary meaning before gaining
protection.66  The Court was especially concerned with the
possibility that a secondary meaning requirement could create
particular burdens on small, startup companies.67  The Court
reasoned that denying protection for inherently distinctive
trade dress until secondary meaning was established would
allow competitors to copy and use the originator's trade dress in
markets where the originator had not yet but might want to
expand to in the future.68
2. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc.
Three years after the Two Pesos decision, the Supreme
Court in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc.69 resolved a
split among the Circuits as to whether color alone could
possibly act as a trademark. 70  After deciding that color is
62. See id at 772-74.
63. Id. at 773-74.
64. Id. at 774.
65. Id. at 773.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 775.
68. See id.
69. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
70. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 161. The case dealt with the color of a
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“within the universe of things that can qualify as a
trademark,”71 the Court determined that color was “capable” of
satisfying the statutory definition of a trademark.72  The Court
reasoned that “[i]t is the source-distinguishing ability of a
mark . . . that permits it to serve these [trademark laws] basic
purposes.”73  The Court suggested that color alone, as a feature
of a product, can never be inherently distinctive because color
does not immediately serve these purposes.74  Thus, color alone
can only be protected upon establishing secondary meaning.75
Importantly, the Court acknowledged the functionality
doctrine and the tension that exists between patent and
trademark law when trade dress is at issue.  The Court stated:
“[i]t is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to
encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over
new product designs or functions for a limited time . . . after
which competitors are free to use the innovation.”76  This
statement, along with precedent approving copying and
preserving competition,77 reflects the Court's concern that the
owners of unpatented and uncopyrighted products not be able
to enjoin imitation of their products under the laws of
trademark and unfair competition.78
dry cleaning pad. The Court compared Nutra Sweet v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d
1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) (absolute prohibition against protection of color
alone), with In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (allowing registration of the color pink for fiberglass insulation),
and Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993)
(declining to establish a per se prohibition against protecting color alone as a
trademark).
71. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162.
72. See id. at 162-63.
73. Id. at 164.
74. See id. at 162.
75. See id.  The Court stated that:
[A] product's color is unlike “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive”
words or designs, which almost automatically tell a customer that
they refer to a brand . . . . The imaginary word “Suntost,” or the words
“Suntost Marmalade,” on a jar of orange jam immediately would
signal a brand or product “source”; the jam's orange color does not do
so.
Id. at 163.
76. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164.
77. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
157-60 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
78. See William D. Raman, Troubled Times For Trade Dress Law, 497
LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 345,
351 (1997).
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3. Effects of the Supreme Court Decisions
The Court's decisions in Two Pesos and Qualitex have
expanded the ability to protect trade dress under the Lanham
Act.  However, since these decisions did not mandate standards
for the inherent distinctiveness of product configurations, the
Circuit Courts of Appeals have established their own varying
standards.  There is little dispute between the Circuit Courts
over applying the traditional Abercrombie trademark
classifications to product packaging trade dress.  Nevertheless,
the Circuit Courts have formulated different, conflicting
approaches for determining the inherent distinctiveness of
product configurations.79
D. CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
1. Second Circuit: The Knitwaves Test
In Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.,80 the Second Circuit
faced the task of determining “what it means for trade dress to
be ‘inherently distinctive.’”81  The court held that designs on
children's sweaters were product features and, in contrast with
product packaging, should not be analyzed for inherent
distinctiveness using the Abercrombie classifications.82
The court found that Two Pesos did not intend to nullify
the statutory definition of a trademark requiring “a person
‘us[e]’ or ‘inten[d] to use’ the mark ‘to identify and distinguish
his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others
79. See infra Part D (describing the various standards used by the Circuit
Courts of Appeals).
80. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
81. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Knitwaves court sought to determine the distinctiveness of children's
sweaters designed with “leaf” and “squirrel” patterns.  Id. The defendant in
Knitwaves had admittedly copied the design of the plaintiff's sweaters. Id. at
999.
82. See id. at 1007.  The court stated that:
Not only does the classification of marks into “generic,” “descriptive,”
“suggestive,” or “arbitrary or fanciful” make little sense when applied
to product features, but it would have the unwelcome, and likely
unintended, result of treating a class of product features as
“inherently distinctive,” and thus eligible for trade dress protection,
even though they were never intended to serve a source-identifying
function.
Id. at 1007.
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and to indicate the source of the goods.’”83  The court found that
the presumption of this source identifying function given to
inherently distinctive product packaging under Abercrombie
should not be extended to product configurations because
configurations are primarily aesthetic or functional rather than
source identifying.84  The court thus found that the proper
inquiry for determining inherent distinctiveness is to ask
whether product features are “likely to serve primarily as a
designator of origin of the product.”85  Important in this inquiry
is the producer's intent to use a product design as source
identification.86
In 1997, the Second Circuit applied the Knitwaves test in
Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co.87  The court
concluded that “this circuit appears to be moving toward a rule
that packaging is usually indicative of a product's source, while
the design or configuration of the product is usually not so.”88
2. Third Circuit: The Duraco Test
In Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.,89
the Third Circuit sought to “delineate when, if ever, product
configurations should be deemed inherently distinctive.”90  The
case dealt with the copying of the shape and texture of a garden
planter.91  The court, like the Second Circuit in Knitwaves,
found the Abercrombie classifications inapplicable to
determining inherent distinctiveness in product
configurations.92
The court recognized that Two Pesos made extensive
83. Id. at 1008 (citing Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
1127)).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1008 (quoting Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises,
Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1449 (3d Cir. 1994)).
86. See id. at 1008-09.
87. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir.
1997).
88. Id. at 379.
89. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
90. Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1440.
91. Id. at 1433.
92. See id. at 1441.  The court stated that, “the very basis for the
[traditional Abercrombie] taxonomy-the descriptive relationship between the
mark and the product, along with the degree to which the mark describes the
product-is unsuited for application to the product itself.”  Id.
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reference to the Abercrombie classifications but determined
that the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether the
classifications should be applied to product configurations.93
The court also determined that the trade dress at issue in Two
Pesos was more like product packaging than product
configuration.94  For these reasons, the court declined to treat
Two Pesos as binding precedent as applied to configurations.
The court found the Abercrombie classifications an
improper framework for product features which, “[b]eing
constitutive of the product itself and thus having no such
dialectical relationship to the product, . . . cannot be said to be
‘suggestive’ or ‘descriptive’ of the product, or ‘arbitrary’ or
‘fanciful’ in relation to it.”95  Thus, product features could never
be inherently distinctive under Abercrombie.  The court also
held that the presumption of source identifying ability
permitted inherently distinctive trademarks and product
packaging under the Abercrombie test is inappropriate for
product configurations.96  The court reasoned that a product's
configuration does not generally give rise to such a
presumption because consumers are more likely to view the
feature as contributing to the inherent appeal of the product
and not to any source designating function.97
Nevertheless, the court determined that product
configurations could be inherently distinctive under certain
circumstances.  The court found these circumstances would
arise when a product configuration serves a “virtually exclusive
identifying function for consumers” and “where consumers are
especially likely to perceive a connection between the product's
configuration and its source.”98  Taking into account these
93. See id. at 1442.
94. See id.  The court distinguished between packaging and configurations
stating:
Product packaging designs, like trademarks, often share membership
in a practically inexhaustible set of distinct but approximately
equivalent variations, and an exclusive right to a particular overall
presentation does not substantially hinder competition in the
packaged good, the item in which a consumer has a basic interest.  A
product configuration, contrariwise, commonly has finite competitive
variations that, on the whole, are equally acceptable to consumers.
Id. at 1448.
95. Id. at 1440-41.
96. See id. at 1448.
97. See id. at 1441.
98. Id. at 1448.  The court further reasoned that under these
circumstances, concerns over the misappropriation of an identifying feature
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principles, the court held that Lanham Act protection could be
afforded for product features if they are unusual and
memorable, conceptually separable from the product, and likely
to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product.99
3. Eighth Circuit: The Stuart Hall Test
The Stuart Hall court sought to determine the proper test
for determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.100  The
case examined the manufacturer of specialized notebooks and
pads whose graphics and text were copied and sold at a lower
price by a competitor.101  The Stuart Hall court adopted the
Abercrombie standards for determining inherent
distinctiveness in all types of trade dress cases.102
The court, in accepting the Abercrombie classifications,
cited Two Pesos to find that the bases for legal protection of
trade dress are not distinct from protection of traditional
trademarks.103  Further, the court embraced a broad
interpretation of Two Pesos as applying Abercrombie to “trade
dress” as a single concept including both product configuration
and product packaging.104  In support of this interpretation, the
court reasoned that the restaurant décor at issue in Two Pesos
fit more properly within the category of a product configuration
as opposed to product packaging.105  Thus, the court found that
creating a distinction between the standards to be applied to
product configuration and product packaging would be contrary
and the cost to a business of gaining and proving secondary meaning would
outweigh concerns over inhibiting competition.  Id.
99. See id. at 1449.  The court noted that the third prong of the test is not
satisfied if the product configuration “is likely to be notably desirable to
consumers for some reason other than its function as a source designator.”  Id.
at 1450.
100. Stuart Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).
101. See id. at 783.
102. See id. at 788.
103. See id. at 784.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 788.  The court stated:
The room and . . . furnishing [of a restaurant] are not packaging,
which is separate from product and to be thrown away once the
product is removed from its packaging, but are part of the restaurant
experience itself-the product itself is the room and its furnishing as
well as whatever food is served.
Id.
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to Two Pesos.106
The court found the Abercrombie classifications
appropriate to “address the relation between the product and
the trade dress.”107  The court held that if a certain trade dress
is only tenuously connected to the nature of the product, then
the dress is inherently distinctive and no secondary meaning
need be shown.108  If, on the other hand, the trade dress is
dictated by the nature of the product, secondary meaning must
be proven.109
In formulating this standard, the court rejected any source
identification requirement for determining the inherent
distinctiveness of product features.110
4. Fifth Circuit: The Pebble Beach Test
In Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I,111 the Fifth Circuit sought
to determine the distinctiveness of three golf hole designs
copied by the defendant from the plaintiff's famous golf
courses.112  The court applied the Abercrombie classifications to
the designs in order to determine whether they were
protectable product configuration trade dress.113
Like the Eighth Circuit in Stuart Hall, the court read Two
Pesos to instruct that the tests for determining the
protectability of trademarks and trade dress are the same.114
But, importantly, the court stated that with trade dress, the
question is “whether a combination of features creates a
distinctive visual impression, identifying the source of the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 786.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 787. The court found that this requirement “would
undermine Two Pesos by requiring that, in order to be inherently distinctive, a
trade dress be shown to meet a version of the secondary meaning test with a
lesser burden of production.”  Id. at 788.
111. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
112. Id. at 534-35.  The defendant, Tour 18 I, created golf courses
exclusively of golf holes copied from famous golf courses all around the
country.  See id.  The plaintiffs were owners of three famous golf courses,
Pebble Beach, Pinehurst, and Harbour Town Golf Links.  See id. at 532.  The
defendants copied one hole from each of the plaintiffs' golf courses into their
own course. See id. at 533.  None of the holes had federal trademark
registration, copyright, or utility patent on the designs.  See id.
113. See id. at 540-42.
114. See id. at 535 (citing Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768-70, 773-74).
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product.”115  Further, the court reasoned in dicta that in order
to be inherently distinctive a product must not only be unique
but also “sufficiently distinctive to indicate source.”116
Thus, although the court's test for inherent distinctiveness
is not yet well established, the court has signaled the
importance it places on protectable trade dress functioning as a
designator of source.  And, despite embracing Abercrombie, the
Fifth Circuit in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co.117
sympathized with the Duraco court's concern regarding the
difficulty of presuming that product configurations serve as
source designators.118  This decision hints at a more stringent
application of the traditional Abercrombie test.
5. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: The Seabrook Test
In Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.,119 the court
formulated a test for determining inherent distinctiveness and
applied the test to a product packaging design.120  The Seabrook
test has been adopted by several courts seeking to determine
the inherent distinctiveness of product configurations.121 The
Seabrook court sought to determine if a “stylized leaf design” on
a bag of frozen vegetables was “arbitrary or distinctive” and
115. Id. at 536 (quoting Sunbeam Prods. v. West Bend, Co., 123 F.3d 246,
251 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1795 (1998)).
116. Id. at 541 n.7.
117. 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1795 (1998).
118. See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 123 F.3d at 252-53.  In Sunbeam, the
Fifth Circuit observed:
Insofar as product configurations are fundamentally different from
trademarks and trade dress, there is some question whether a
product configuration can ever be deemed “inherently distinctive.”  Id.
at 252.  Unlike traditional trademarks and trade dress, which
function primarily to identify the source of a given product, the
primary purpose of product configuration is not identification.  Id. at
252-53.  Accordingly, as the Third Circuit stated, “one cannot
automatically conclude from a product feature or configuration—as
one can from a product's arbitrary name, for example—that, to a
consumer, it functions primarily to denote the product's source.”
Id. at 253 (quoting Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1441).
119. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A.
1977).
120. See id. at 1344-46.
121. See, e.g, Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d 363; I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998); Landscape Forms, Inc.,
113 F.3d 373; Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d 1431; Krueger Int'l, Inc., 915 F.
Supp. 595.
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thus inherently distinctive.122
The test used by the court to determine inherent
distinctiveness asked whether the design was (1) common; (2)
unique or unusual in a particular field; (3) a mere refinement of
a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for
a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or
ornamentation for the goods; or (4) capable of creating a
distinct commercial impression.123  The court found the design
was not inherently distinctive because it was not “an
unmistakable, certain, and primary means of identification
pointing distinctly to the commercial origin of such product.”124
More recently, in I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co.,125 the
First Circuit applied the Seabrook test to determine the
inherent distinctiveness of a product configuration.126  To justify
its use of the Seabrook test, the court interpreted Two Pesos
narrowly to instruct only that inherently distinctive trade dress
need not demonstrate secondary meaning.127  The court also
interpreted Two Pesos to allow flexibility in the creation of
standards for determining the inherent distinctiveness of trade
dress as long as the test does not “eviscerate[ ] the distinction
between inherently distinctive trade dress and trade dress that
has acquired secondary meaning.”128
Interestingly, the court stated that the “Seabrook Foods
test is largely consistent with the Second Circuit's Knitwaves
test for inherent distinctiveness, that is, [it focuses on] whether
the design ‘is likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin
of the product.’”129
122. See Seabrook Foods, Inc., 568 F.2d at 1344.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1345.
125. 163 F.3d at 40.  The court sought to determine the inherent
distinctiveness of a wall mounted faucet that had been on display at the
Museum of Modern Art.  See id. at 32.
126. See id. at 39-41.
127. See id. at 40.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 41 (citing Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1008). The Second Circuit in
Landscape Forms accepted the Seabrook test as a “useful tool[ ] to assess
whether a design is likely to be perceived as a source indicator.”  Landscape
Forms, Inc., 113 F.3d at 378 n.3.
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6. Summary of the Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions
The Circuit Courts are split on how to determine the
inherent distinctiveness of product features.130  The most
apparent split concerns Two Pesos and whether it requires the
application of the Abercrombie classifications to product
configurations.
The First, Second, and Third Circuits have held that Two
Pesos allows them to formulate standards for the inherent
distinctiveness of product configurations that vary from the
Abercrombie analysis.131  These Circuits have in common a
source identification requirement eliminating the presumption
of source designating ability given to inherently distinctive
trademarks under Abercrombie.  This requirement allows the
court to inquire into the likelihood that a product feature will
serve as a designator of source as opposed to an alternative
function.  Nevertheless, there are still disputes among this
group of courts.132
On the other hand, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits read Two
Pesos to require the application of the Abercrombie standards to
product configurations.133  The Eighth Circuit finds trade dress
inherently distinctive if it is tenuously connected with the
nature of the product.134  This finding creates the presumption
of source identifying ability and allows protection from copying.
The Fifth Circuit test may impose greater requirements before
the product configuration is placed into one of Abercrombie's
inherently distinctive categories.135
130. See supra Part I.D (describing the various Circuit Courts of Appeals
tests).
131. See supra Part I.D. 1, 2, 5 (describing the Second, Third, and First
Circuit tests).
132. The Second Circuit has rejected the first two prongs of the Third
Circuit's more stringent test.  Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1009 n.6.  The First
Circuit, although equating its adoption of Seabrook as generally consistent
with the Knitwaves test, noted that its test, in contrast with the Second
Circuit's, maintains a clear distinction between the inquiry into secondary
meaning and the inquiry into inherent distinctivenss.  I.P. Lund Trading ApS,
163 F.3d at 41.  The First Circuit also found the Knitwaves inquiry into intent
to use a product feature as a designator of source was not entitled much
weight in determining inherent distinctiveness.  See id.
133. See supra Part I.D. 3, 4 (describing the Fifth and Eighth Circuits'
adoption of the Abercrombie classifications).
134. See supra Part I.D. 3 (describing the Eighth Circuit test).
135. See supra Part I.D. 4 (describing the Fifth Circuit test and its possibly
stringent application of the Abercrombie classifications).
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II. CASE DESCRIPTION OF ASHLEY FURNITURE
INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SANGIACOMO N.A. LTD.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in Ashley Furniture defined
the issue to be a determination of the circumstances qualifying
the configuration or feature of a product as inherently
distinctive.136  The court relied heavily on Two Pesos to find that
the Abercrombie classifications provide the appropriate
framework for accessing the inherent distinctiveness of product
features.137  The court read Two Pesos' endorsement of the
Abecrombie classifications by the Fifth Circuit in Chevron and
Two Pesos to mandate the application of the analysis to all
trade dress cases.138
The court rejected the reasoning of courts that hold that
Abercrombie is an appropriate analysis for trademarks and
product packaging, which are conceptually separable from the
product, but that it is not well suited for application to the
product itself.139  The court then defined the trade dress of a
product, even if a product configuration, to “consist[ ] not of the
entire product but only of those nonfunctional features of the
product that, taken together, make up its total image.”140
The court interpreted Two Pesos to “indicate[ ], if . . . not
require, that lower courts should use [the Abercrombie]
analysis in product configuration cases generally.”141  The court
interpreted the restaurant trade dress at issue in Two Pesos as
part of the product being sold at the restaurant.142  Thus, the
court cast Two Pesos as a product configuration case.  This
converted the Supreme Court's apparent approval of
Abercrombie in Two Pesos into authority mandating the
application of the classifications to product configurations.
The court further held it possible to apply Abercrombie, in
and of itself, to product configurations but noted that in some
136. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 366.
137. See id. at 370-73.
138. See id. at 370.
139. See id. The court's disapproval included the holdings in Knitwaves,
Inc., 71 F.3d 996, and the holding in Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d 1431,
which refused to apply the Abercrombie classifications.  See Ashley Furniture
Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 370.
140. Id. (citing Stuart Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th
Cir. 1995)).
141. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 370.
142. See id.
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cases it would present difficulties.143  The court determined that
these difficulties could be clarified by comparing the
configuration at issue to those of related products under the
Seabrook test.144  The court posited that Seabrook could help
determine the crucial question of whether a product
configuration should be classified as inherently distinctive or
generic.145  The court stated:
Seabrook makes plain that a product's overall design cannot be found
inherently distinctive if it constitutes a “well-known” or “common”
design, even if that design had not before been “refine[d]” in precisely
the same way.  Rather, to qualify as inherently distinctive a design
must be “unique or unusual” in the “particular field” at issue.
146
Thus, the court held that for a product configuration to be
arbitrary or fanciful, the configuration must fit Seabrook's
“unique or unusual” in a particular field requirement.
The court then found in Two Pesos the basis for rejecting
the defendant's argument that a test based on source
identification requirements should be applied to product
configuration cases.147  Initially, the court noted that Two Pesos
expressed the Supreme Court's desire for a uniform approach to
claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.148  The court
interpreted Two Pesos to direct that the text of Section 43(a)
would not support a “differentiation between trade dress and
trademark”149 and that “the creation of a new rule to be applied
only to product configuration would comport neither with the
language of the statute nor with the Court's preference for
143. Id.  As an example of a possible application of Abercrombie to product
configurations, the Ashley Furniture court stated:
The configuration of a banana-flavored candy, for example, would be
generic if the candy were round, descriptive if it were shaped like a
banana, suggestive if it were shaped like a monkey, arbitrary if it
were shaped like a trombone, and fanciful if it were formed into some
hitherto unknown shape.
Id.
The court did not explicitly state the nature of the difficulties that may arise
when applying Abercrombie to product configurations.
144. See id. at 371.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 371-72. The defendant argued for the application of the
alternative tests adopted by I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 41;
Landscape Forms, Inc., 113 F.3d at 378 n.3; Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at
1450.  See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 371-72.
148. Id. at 371.
149. Id.
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uniformity.”150
The court further criticized the First, Second, and Third
Circuit tests by holding that they are in specific conflict with
Two Pesos' description of inherently distinctive trade dress as
that which is “capable of identifying products or services as
coming from a specific source.”151  The court interpreted Two
Pesos' rejection of requiring “actual” consumer recognition for
inherently distinctive trade dress to suggest that “likely”
consumer recognition is also improper.152  The court further
held that requiring “likely” consumer recognition is contrary to
Two Pesos because it involves showing the same kind of
evidence as required for secondary meaning.153
The court then reasoned that the “capable of identifying a
product” test is more appropriate than the alternate tests
because it does not require an “improper emphasis on source
identification.”154
III. ANALYSIS OF ASHLEY FURNITURE
INDUSTRIES, INC., V. SANGIOCOMO N.A. LTD.
The main holding in Ashley Furniture was that the
Abercrombie classifications must, under direction of Two Pesos,
be applied to product configurations and that the classifications
can be properly applied to configurations. 155  The first section of
the Analysis will examine the individual holdings the Ashley
Furniture court used to arrive at this conclusion.156  The court
held: (1) that Two Pesos decided the issue of the proper
standards to use in determining inherent distinctiveness; (2)
that Two Pesos creates standards for determining inherent
distinctiveness in product configurations; (3) that the
Abercrombie classifications can be properly applied to product
configurations; and (4) that alternative tests for inherent
distinctiveness which incorporate a “source-identification”
requirement undermine the Two Pesos holding.157
The first section of the Analysis concludes that: Two Pesos
150. Id.




155. See supra Part II.
156. See infra Part III.A.
157. See supra Part II.
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did not decide the issue of the proper standards to use in
determining inherent distinctiveness; that Two Pesos did not
create standards specific to product configurations; that the
Abercrombie classifications may not be effectively applied to
configurations; and that “source identification” tests do not
undermine Two Pesos.158
The second section of the Analysis will then propose a test
for determining inherent distinctiveness in product
configurations.159  In doing so, the general problems with the
current standards formulated by the Circuit Courts of Appeals
will be examined, and a test for inherent distinctiveness will be
proposed that seeks to serve the purposes of the Lanham Act.
The second section of the Analysis concludes that the
current standards used by the Circuit Courts of Appeals protect
product configurations under the Lanham Act either too
broadly or restrictively and that the proper standard to use for
this determination is a two part test requiring product
configurations to be (1) unique and striking, and (2) likely to
serve as an indicator of source.160
A. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL HOLDINGS
1. Analysis of Ashley Furniture's holding that Two Pesos
indicated the proper standards to use in determining
inherent distinctiveness
The Ashley Furniture court made it clear that Two Pesos
indicated, if not required, that the Abercrombie classifications
be used in the trade dress context.161  This conclusion assumes
that Two Pesos formulated the Abercrombie test as appropriate
for determining inherent distinctiveness in all types of trade
dress cases.
In Two Pesos, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the only issue before the Court was whether inherently
distinctive trade dress should be required to have acquired
secondary meaning before gaining Lanham Act protection.162
158. See infra Part III.A.
159. See infra Part III.B.
160. See infra Part III.B.
161. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 370.
162. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767.
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Two Pesos was an appeal from a jury verdict.163  The parties in
the case stipulated that the legal rules utilized in other areas of
trademark law apply equally well to trade dress.  The litigants
did not object to the jury instruction on that basis, and
therefore were not adverse on the question of whether the
Abercrombie standards applied to trade dress.  The nature and
breadth of Abercrombie was thus not an issue at the Supreme
Court level.
In light of Two Pesos procedural posture, it seems
reasonable that the Court's approval of Abercrombie was a way
for the Court to illustrate its approval of any trade dress
analysis that allows for a finding of inherent distinctiveness
without an additional finding of secondary meaning.  Or
perhaps the Court did nothing more than affirm the use of the
Abercrombie factors in the single case before it.
Contrary to this interpretation of Two Pesos, the Fourth,
Fifth and Eighth Circuits read Two Pesos to require that the
Abercrombie spectrum be applied to product configurations.164
As discussed above, other Circuit Courts do not interpret Two
Pesos in this manner.  Moreover, as stated in I.P. Lund, courts
can exercise a great deal of discretion in determining inherent
distinctiveness without running afoul of the narrow Two Pesos
holding that inherently distinctive trade dress need not show
proof of secondary meaning in order to gain protection under
the Lanham Act.165  This is consistent with the fact that Two
Pesos decided this issue and created binding authority on this
issue alone.
2. Analysis of Ashley Furniture's holding that Two Pesos
creates standards for determining inherent distinctiveness
in product configurations
As noted above, the Fourth Circuit in Ashley Furniture
determined that the issue of whether to apply the Abercrombie
standards to trade dress was decided in Two Pesos.166  The court
then used this finding to conclude that Two Pesos creates
strong, if not binding, authority to apply Abercrombie generally
163. See id. at 766.
164. See supra Part I.D. 3, 4 and Part II (describing the Eighth, Fifth, and
Fourth Circuit tests).
165. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 40.
166. See supra Part II.
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to product configuration cases.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit seems to have realized that the
Court's approval of Abercrombie was dicta but found it
influential nevertheless.  However, it is important to note that
the Supreme Court did not directly address the possible
differences between product packaging and product
configuration cases in Two Pesos and, by analogy, did not
address whether its approval of Abercrombie applies to product
configurations. 167  In fact, there is reason to believe from the
Two Pesos opinion itself that the trade dress at issue was
product packaging and not product configuration.168  Although
not alone conclusive in clarifying this question, it is also
significant that the Two Pesos Court approved of the Fifth
Circuit's use of the Abercrombie classifications in both the Two
Pesos and Chevron cases.169  The Chevron case dealt solely with
determining inherent distinctiveness in product packaging and
the Supreme Court in Two Pesos made no distinctions between
the applicability of the Abercrombie classifications to the trade
dress at issue in these Fifth Circuit rulings.170
The Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex lends further
support to this narrow interpretation of Two Pesos.  The
Qualitex Court recognized that inherently distinctive
trademarks automatically communicate to consumers that they
refer to a brand while the product feature in the case, a color,
could not.171  The Court held that a product feature, to wit color,
cannot be inherently distinctive and must gain secondary
167. See Barrett, supra note 45, at 486 (discussing that Two Pesos did not
directly address the possible differences between the trade dress at issue in
the case, product packaging trade dress, or product feature trade dress).  See
also Travis L. Bachman, Inherent Distinctiveness, Product Configuration, and
“Product Groups”: The Developing Law of Trade Dress, 23 J. CORP. L. 501, 512
(1998) (questioning whether the Supreme Court in Two Pesos acknowledged
an entirely new type of trade dress, “service industry trade dress,” in which it
is appropriate to use the Abercrombie factors).
168. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 787 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he
first user of an arbitrary package, like the first user of an arbitrary word,
should be entitled to the presumption that his package represents him without
having to show that it does in fact.”).  See also Theodore H. Davis, Jr.,
Management and Protection of Brand Equity in Product Configurations, 1998
U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 75-76 (suggesting that Justices Thomas and Scalia
considered the restaurant trade dress at issue in Two Pesos to be product
packaging).
169. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 773.
170. See id.
171. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162.
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meaning in order to be protectable trade dress.172  Thus, the
Qualitex Court made it clear, even in light of Two Pesos, that
product features may require a different analysis than
trademarks because of inherent differences in source
identifying ability.  That is not to say that Qualitex requires all
product features to acquire secondary meaning to gain Lanham
Act protection.173  Some shapes, designs, and other product
features are more likely to “automatically tell a customer that
they refer to a brand”174 rather than color alone.  At the very
least, Qualitex is a signal from the Court that product features
are different than trademarks and that the Court did not
intend Two Pesos to create a blanket, general test for
determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.
The Fourth Circuit's holding is also in conflict with other
Circuit Courts that do not interpret Two Pesos to hold that the
Abercrombie standards should be applied to product
configuration cases.175  These courts do not accept this
interpretation because, like the Supreme Court in Qualitex,
they recognize the inherent differences in source identifying
ability between trademarks (including product packaging) and
product features.176  These differences render the Abercrombie
classifications, which are well suited and relatively easy to
apply to trademarks and product packaging, inappropriate for
product configurations.177
In addition, the mere difficulty of applying traditional
trademark analysis to product configurations does not fully
express the differences between product packaging and
configurations not addressed by Two Pesos.  First, unlike
granting trademark protection to product packaging, the
protection of product configurations may have anti-competitive
effects on the marketplace.178  Affording trademark protection
172. See id.
173. But see Davis, supra note 168, at 76 (suggesting that the Qualitex
Court's recognition of a class of product characteristics as ineligible for
inherently distinctive status may be significant).
174. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162-63.
175. See supra Part I.D. 1, 2 (The Second and Third Circuits conflict with
the Fourth Circuit.).
176. See Knitwaves, Inc. 71 F.3d at 1008; Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at
1441.
177. See Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1448.
178. See id.  See also Barrett, supra note 45, at 477-78 (noting that the pool
of usable product features is much smaller than the possibly unlimited
combination of product packaging trade dress and thus, granting trade dress
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to product designs is likely to be exclusionary in nature because
designs have limited alternatives and are themselves valuable
to consumers and competitors.179  The exclusionary effect on
competitors may be exacerbated by the fact that trademark law
does not have the same safeguards against overly broad
protection as other intellectual property systems that more
regularly protect product features.180
Second, there is the possibility that affording broad
protection to product configurations under trademark law will
encroach upon the patent law.181  The Supreme Court in
Qualitex raised this concern in its discussion of functionality.182
If design producers could substitute trademark protection for
design patent protection, then it would be possible for a
producer to gain protection for his or her design without
meeting patent law's stringent non-obviousness and novelty
requirements.  These requirements seek to insure that ideas in
the public domain remain there for public use.183
Thus, affording trademark protection to product
configurations raises important issues that do not arise with
product packaging or trademarks.  It is doubtful that the
Supreme Court would lump together such varying parts of
trade dress without comment.
3. Analysis of Ashley Furniture's application of the
Abercrombie classifications to product configurations
The Fourth Circuit's decision to combine the Abercrombie
protection to product features is more likely to have a negative effect on
competitors).
179. See Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1448.  See also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teological Approach to Trademark Law,
84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 636 (1999) (suggesting that trademark protection for
product designs may confine the possible supply of shapes by which a product
can be designed and that the restraints imposed upon a competitor's choice of
source identifier may effectively act as a constriction of production choices).
180. See Dinwoodie, supra note 179 at 636.  Professor Dinwoodie notes
safeguards such as pre-fixed temporal limits and the requirement of novelty in
patent law.  See id.  Trademark law possesses none of these provisions.
181. See Melissa R. Glieberman, From Fast Cars To Fast Food: Overbroad
Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act, 45
STAN. L. REV. 2037, 2058-63 (1993) (discussing conflicts between trademark
and patent law created by an overbroad reading of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act).
182. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164.
183. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
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and Seabrook tests is especially telling of the inappropriateness
of applying Abercrombie to product configurations.
In order to support the argument that it is not “inherently
impossible, illogical, or anomalous to apply the Abercrombie
categories to product configurations,”184 the court presented
what it determined was a workable example.185  The example is
illustrative of problems with the court's argument that product
configurations are not the “product itself” but rather specific
non-functional features of the product.  First, the court's
analysis of different shapes of “banana-flavored candy”186
ignores the fact that a product and its shape can never be
“totally unrelated.”187  Unlike a trademark, there is always a
direct conceptual connection between the product and its shape.
The shape, being part of the product itself, may serve merely to
“describe” to the consumer a characteristic that makes it more
appealing.188  The Abercrombie classifications do not, in the
absence of secondary meaning, protect marks which function
solely to describe or make a product more desirable.189  The
shape could then only be “descriptive” of the product.  Using
this reasoning, a product configuration can never be properly
classified as inherently distinctive under Abercrombie.190
Second, it is hard to imagine when a product such as an
automobile or a piece of furniture could ever be “arbitrary”
under the court's standard and still be marketable. Could a
table be protected only if it were shaped like a hamburger?  Or,
could an automobile design be protected only if it were shaped
like a beer bottle?  For most products, there is a limit as to how
distinct a design can be in relation to the product before it
becomes undesirable to consumers.  Thus, even if the court's
example is a proper characterization of an “arbitrary”
relationship, it may only help access the inherent
distinctiveness of novelty products.
184. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 370.
185. See id. at 370 (providing an example of different shapes of “banana-
flavored candy” and how these shapes would be classified under Abercrombie).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 369 (defining arbitrary and fanciful product features as
“totally unrelated” to the product).
188. See Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1441 (reasoning that consumers
are more likely to view product features as contributing to the inherent appeal
of the product).
189. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (discussing “descriptive”
marks under the Abercrombie classifications).
190. See id.
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The Ashley Furniture court's adoption of the Seabrook
factors was intended to alleviate the above problems.191  By
adoption of these factors, the court equates a product feature
which is “unique and unusual” in a particular field with a
product feature which is “totally unrelated” to the product
itself.192  First, because even a “unique and unusual” product
design is a part of the product itself, it cannot be “totally
unrelated” to the product.  This is true even if the “unique and
unusual” feature meets Seabrook's more than a “mere
refinement”193 standard.  A “unique and unusual” combination
of product features that are more than a “mere refinement” of
those used in previous designs are still a part of the product
itself.  Thus, there is a conflict between Seabrook's “unique and
unusual” and Abercromie's “totally unrelated” definitions and
they cannot be properly equated.
Second, courts and commentators alike have rejected the
notion that uniqueness alone can be equated with inherent
distinctiveness.194  Courts do accept uniqueness as one factor in
determining the inherent distinctiveness of product features
but do not rely on it alone.195
Proponents of using Seabrook in conjunction with
Abercrombie may nevertheless argue the tests are compatible
because the Seabrook test is based on the Abercrombie
191. See supra Part II.
192. See id.
193. See Seabrook Foods, Inc., 568 F.2d at 1344.
194. See Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 541 n.7 (rejecting uniqueness alone
to determine inherent distinctiveness while applying the Abercrombie test);
Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1441 (arguing that product designs are not
protectable simply because they are unusual).  See also 1 J. MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:13, at 8-35 to 8-36
(2d ed. 1984) (“[A] product . . . feature is not inherently distinctive merely
because there is no other product on the market that looks exactly the same.”);
Nancy D. Chapman, Trade Dress Protection in the United States After the
Supreme Court Decision in Two Pesos, 387, Advanced Seminar on Trademark
Law 7, 32 (1994) (“[U]nique is not by itself equivalent to inherently distinctive,
but a unique design may be so if it also functions as a source indicator.”).
195. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 40-41 (accepting the Seabrook
test and its uniqueness requirement as part of its “likely to serve primarily as
a designator of origin of the product” test); Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 541
n.7 (defining an inherently distinctive product configuration as unique, but
noting that the converse is not necessarily true); Landscape Forms, Inc., 113
F.3d at 378 n.3 (arguing that the Seabrook factors, including the uniqueness
requirement, can “be useful tools to assess whether a design is ‘likely to be
perceived as a source indicator’”); Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1449
(requiring that a product configuration “partake of a unique, individualized
appearance” as one part of its three prong test).
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classifications.  In fact, Seabrook was formulated to determine
“whether a design is arbitrary or distinctive.”196  However, it
must be reiterated that the Seabrook court formulated its test
for inherent distinctiveness in the context of product packaging
which is separable and can be “totally unrelated” to the product
it packages. 197  Thus, there is no conflict in using Seabrook to
determine whether a particular packaging is “arbitrary.”  In
contrast, product configurations can never be “totally
unrelated” to a product and therefore Seabrook cannot be used
to make up for this defect when Abercrombie is applied to
configurations.
4. Analysis of Ashley Furniture's Rejection of “Source
Identification” Requirements
The Fourth Circuit in Ashley Furniture criticized tests
formulated by other courts requiring that product
configurations meet a source identification requirement.198  The
court reasoned that these tests would conflict with the Lanham
Act and would undermine the Two Pesos holding.199
When the Two Pesos Court spoke of applying the same
analysis under Section 43(a) to both trademarks and trade
dress, it determined that when a trademark or trade dress is
found to be inherently distinctive, no additional showing of
secondary meaning should be required in either case.200  As
noted above, Two Pesos did not address the issue of how to
arrive at the determination of inherent distinctiveness.201  The
First, Second, and Third Circuits read Two Pesos to allow the
formulation of appropriate tests for inherent distinctiveness as
long as they do not require a showing of secondary meaning.  It
follows that tests for the inherent distinctiveness of product
configurations that do not require secondary meaning do not
conflict with the test for inherently distinctive trademarks.
Thus, harmony between trademarks and product
196. See Seabrook Foods, Inc., 568 F.2d at 1344.
197. Id.
198. See Ashley Furniture Inudustries, Inc, 187 F.3d at 371-72.
199. See supra Part II.
200. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 773.  The Court stated that “[t]here is no
persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two [trademark and trade
dress].  The ‘proposition that secondary meaning must be shown even if the
trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, [is] wrong.’”
201. See supra Part III.A.1.
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configurations, under Section 43(a), is achieved as directed by
Two Pesos.
The alternate tests rejected by the Fourth Circuit all
generally require that plaintiffs in an infringement suit show
that the product feature they seek to protect will be likely to
function primarily as an indicator of source.202  This
requirement focuses on the likelihood that a product feature
will have an inherent ability to automatically function as a
designator of source of the product.  The requirement is
therefore a predictive measure focusing on “whether a
consumer would likely perceive the feature or combination or
arrangement of features as something that renders the product
intrinsically more desirable regardless of the source of the
product, or . . . as a signifier of the product's source.”203  The
secondary meaning requirement, on the other hand, is a factual
finding focusing on a consumer's actual mental association of
the trade dress with its source.204
The evidence required to show that a product feature is
likely to function as an indicator of source is also different from
that used to establish secondary meaning.  As noted above,
courts use the Seabrook test and other factors to help predict
whether a product feature is likely to be immediately
recognized by consumers primarily as an indicator of source.205
In contrast, secondary meaning is proven with empirical
evidence showing that consumers actually associate a certain
trade dress with a source.206  Thus, contrary to the Fourth
Circuit's holding, the distinction between inherent
distinctiveness and secondary meaning is not blurred by source
identification requirements.  They are two separate and
distinct types of analysis.
The Fourth Circuit did recognize that source identification
requirements would not necessarily require the same kinds of
evidence as secondary meaning but determined that even more
modest requirements would impermissibly require conscious
202. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 41; Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at
1008; Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1449.
203. Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1450.
204. See id.
205. See supra Part I.D. 1, 2, 5 (describing the Second, Third, and First
Circuit tests; all applying a predictive analysis).
206. See Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d at 795 (Factors used to access secondary
meaning can include amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, and
length and manner of use.).
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consumer recognition of a product design as a source
designator.207  The court's reasoning is open to criticism since
source identification tests never require even one consumer to
consciously recognize a product feature as an indicator of
source.  Source identification requirements seek only to make a
prediction as to the ability of a product feature to serve as a
source designator.
In this sense, source identification requirements are
similar to Abercrombie as applied to trademarks and product
packaging.  Because Abercrombie can be used to effectively
analyze the relationship between a trademark and product, the
test can be used to predict whether the trademark will function
as a source identifier.  “Suggestive,” “arbitrary,” or “fanciful”
trademarks and packaging almost certainly serve as source
designators.208  This certainty arises because there is no other
function that the inherently distinctive trademark or non-
functional packaging can perform.209  The legal presumption as
to source identifying ability is appropriate because it is highly
likely to reach the correct result; protection of product features
that designate source.
Product features, on the other hand, are part of the product
itself and may be seen by consumers to perform several
functions at once.210  Thus, features cannot be effectively
predicted for source identifying ability under Abercrombie.211
Abercrombie's presumption of this ability, without a separate
207. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 372.
208. See Smith, supra note 25, at 426-28 (arguing that trademarks
traditionally analyzed under Abercrombie serve either to communicate a
product's attributes or source.  Those trademarks in the inherently distinctive
categories do not communicate product attributes, so, by process of
elimination, they can only serve to communicate source).
209. See id.  For example, when a penguin is used as a trademark to denote
a publishing company it has no direct or conceptual relation to the publishing
company.  It thus does not describe the company and can only serve to identify
source.
210. See Christopher J. Kellner, Rethinking the Procedural Treatment of
Functionality: Confronting the Inseparability of Useful, Aesthetically Pleasing,
and Source-Identifying Features of Product Designs, 46 EMORY L.J. 913, 914
(1997) (noting that consumers could view single product configurations as
embodying trademark, useful, and aesthetically pleasing features).
211. For example, the design of a piece of furniture can serve to make it
more attractive or appealing, thus describing the furniture to the consumer.
Alternatively, it could serve some utilitarian purpose or identify the source of
its producer.  Even if a utilitarian function is eliminated, the feature may still
describe the product or identify source.  One or the other cannot be eliminated
without further inquiry.
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predictive analysis, may therefore lead to trade dress protection
of product features that are not be seen by consumers to
designate source.  These features should remain in the public
domain and free for competitors to copy in the absence of
patent protection or until they have acquired secondary
meaning.
In the Fourth Circuit test, any configuration whose total
image satisfies Seabrook's “unique and unusual” requirement is
inherently distinctive and presumed to be “capable of
identifying a product.” 212  In doing so, the court adopted the
Supreme Court's “capable of identifying products” standard
from Two Pesos. 213  However, it is not clear that the Supreme
Court's use of this standard means that a presumption of
source identifying ability should be given to inherently
distinctive product features.  The Court has called trademarks
“almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning.”214
Descriptive marks and color fall within this broad category but
require a showing of secondary meaning in order to be
protected.215  Inherently distinctive trademarks and packaging
too are capable of identifying the source of a product and are
properly presumed to do so.  Product configurations are also
capable of identifying source and require a predictive analysis
that lies between the secondary meaning requirement and the
presumption because of their inherent qualities.  Thus, it could
be that the Supreme Court's use of the “capable of identifying
products” language means nothing beyond its designation of
marks that might have the ability to act as designators of
source.
Thus, it seems that the Fourth Circuit's, like the Eight
Circuit's, rejection of source identification requirements is not
required by Two Pesos and may extend trade dress protection
too broadly.
212. See supra Part II.
213. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 773.
214. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162.
215. See supra Part I.A (describing the requirements for “descriptive”
marks under the Abercrombie standards).
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B. THE PROPOSED STANDARD FOR DETERMINING INHERENT
DISTINCTIVENESS
1. Problems with the Current Circuit Court Standards
The standards for determining the inherent distinctiveness
of product configurations developed by the Circuit Courts and
discussed above can be placed into two general groups.
Although all the standards have been properly formulated
under Two Pesos, both sets of standards may fail in some cases
to serve the broad purposes of the Lanham Act.216
The first group consists of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Circuits, which adhere to the Abercrombie classifications for
analyzing inherent distinctiveness.217  As discussed above,
Abercrombie cannot properly be applied to product
configurations.218  By applying Abercrombie, product
configurations may be improperly presumed to have source
identifying ability and may lead to the protection of
configurations that do not signify source.  Protection of these
configurations is in conflict with the Lanham Act's purpose to
offer exclusive rights and remove from the public domain only
those marks or trade dress which serve to designate source.219
To remedy this problem it is more proper to predict rather than
presume the source identifying ability of a product design.
The First, Second, and Third Circuits have formulated
standards that predict the source identifying ability of product
configurations.220  In general, these tests require that a
protectable product configuration be likely to act primarily as
an indicator of source.  These stringent standards properly
reduce the possibility of anti-competitive marketplace effects
created by overly broad trade dress protection and also
maintain the boundaries between the intellectual property
regimes.  This approach is also problematic since product
features that identify source and concurrently increase the
216. See supra Part I.A (describing the intent and purpose of the Lanham
Act).
217. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 371; Pebble Beach
Co., 155 F.3d at 541; Stuart Hall Co., Inc., 51 F.3d at 788.
218. See supra Part III.1.c.
219. See supra Part I.A (describing the intent and purpose of the Lanham
Act).
220. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 41; Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at
1008; Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1449.
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inherent appeal of a product may not be protected.  In this case,
product configurations that are not functional in the utilitarian
or aesthetic sense,221 and serve as designators of source are
denied trademark protection.  A lack of protection may cause
consumers who immediately identify a particular product
feature with a source to become confused when a competitor
copies it.  The competitor would then benefit from the goodwill
created by the originator's product.  These are the very results
which trademark law seeks to prevent.222
Thus, it seems that the development of standards for
inherent distinctiveness could be more properly satisfied by an
analysis with a level of stringency that lies between those
formulated by the two groups of Circuit Courts of Appeals.
2. Proposed Standard
The following proposed test seeks to balance the positive
aspects of the stringent First, Second, and Third Circuit tests
with the purposes of the Lanham Act to protect the goodwill of
businesses and prevent customer confusion.  It will be required
that a product feature be nonfunctional in the utilitarian and
aesthetic sense223 before proceeding with the proposed test for
inherent distinctiveness.
The first step of the proposed standard is based on the
Seabrook test224 and would be satisfied only if a product feature
is “unique” and “striking” among a certain product group.  The
second step of the proposed standard is based on the source
identification tests developed in the Courts of Appeals225 and
would ask whether a product feature satisfying step one would
be likely to function as an indicator of source.
The purpose of the first prong is to determine the
distinctiveness of the particular product feature within its
appropriate product group.  First, it is proposed that expert
testimony be allowed to present evidence that a feature or
combination of features is unique within the group.  Here,
expert testimony will be valuable since knowledge of the
221. See supra Part I.B (defining functionality in the trade dress context).
222. See Part I.A (describing the purpose of trademark law).
223. See supra Part I.B (defining functionality in the trade dress context).
224. See supra Part I.D.5 (describing the Seabrook test).
225. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 41; Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at
1008; Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1449.
2000] PRODUCT CONFIGURATION TRADE DRESS 217
breadth of products in a particular field is essential to
determining “uniqueness.”  The feature should be more than a
“mere refinement” of commonplace features as directed by the
Seabrook standard.226  This will provide a baseline of product
features that are sufficiently different or unique than their
predecessors within the product group.  Many courts already
accept “uniqueness” as evidence of inherent distinctiveness.227
Second, it is proposed that the factfinder determine,
without expert testimony, whether a particular feature is
“striking.”  This part of the test seeks to examine whether the
feature “catches the eye” among an array of both unique and
commonplace product configurations within its product group.
The focus of this part of the test should be on the reaction of
consumers to the product design and not that of experts whose
familiarity with products in the field may affect his or her
perceptions of what is “striking.”  Examples of configurations
which might be “striking” upon first sight include the design of
Apple's iMac computer, the design of a Ferrari Testarossa
automobile, or a building designed by the Spanish artist Gaudi.
This part of the test will serve to insure that the configuration
has at least the potential to immediately communicate to
consumers the source of the product.  At this point, the
“unique” and “striking” feature may (1) function as a source
indicator, (2) function to increase the inherent appeal of the
product, or (3) perform both functions.  Thus, further analysis
is required to determine which of these functions will most
likely be performed by the product configuration.
The second step of the test seeks to predict whether the
“unique” and “striking” product configuration is likely to serve
as an indicator of source.  Thus, the proposed test does not
presume source identifying ability like the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuit standards.228  The proposed standard can also be
contrasted to the source identification requirements formulated
by the First, Second, and Third Circuits because it does not
require that the configuration serve exclusively or primarily to
identify source.229  Of course, those configurations likely to
serve solely as indicators of source will gain trade dress
226. See supra Part I.D. 5 (describing the Seabrook test).
227. See supra note 195.
228. See supra Part I.D. 3, 4 and Part II (describing the Eighth, Fifth, and
Fourth Circuit standards).
229. See supra PartI.D. 1, 2, 5 (describing the Second, Third, and First
Circuit standards)
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protection.  These cases will be rare since most visual features
communicate to consumers in more than one way.230  It follows
that under this test a product feature likely to serve as an
indicator of source that also increases the inherent appeal of
the product will not be automatically precluded from trade
dress protection.  This can be directly contrasted with the
extremely stringent Third Circuit standard.231  The proposed
standard would, however, refuse trade dress protection to
configurations that are not likely to be immediately recognized
as having source identifying ability.
An obvious difficulty that may arise in application of the
proposed standard involves quantifying the extent that a
particular product feature must be likely to serve as a source
designator before it can gain trade dress protection.232  Would a
feature that is likely to serve a twenty-five, thirty-five, or fifty
percent source designating function meet the minimum
threshold for protection?  It will also be difficult to separate out
source and aesthetic functions in making this kind of
assessment because a single feature can perform both
functions.233
In addition, any trade dress protection afforded to a
product feature having, for example, a fifty percent source role
will remove the entire feature from the public domain without
meeting the rigors of a design patent.234  This problem forces a
policy choice between patent and trademark law.  Since patents
are effective for a limited statutory period, while trademark
protection can be perpetual, it could be argued that favoring
the patent policy would have the least negative effect on
competition.  Nevertheless, a product feature that is likely to
indicate source to consumers does function as a trademark and
should be protectable under the trademark law regardless of
the availability of the patent regime.  Congress has not
provided statutory direction preferring one intellectual
property regime to another.  In the absence of such direction,
230. See Kellner, supra note 210.
231. See Duraco Products, Inc., 40 F.3d at 1448 (noting that in order to be
inherently distinctive a product feature must serve an almost exclusive source
identifying function).
232. See Kellner, supra note 210, at 915 (recognizing the difficulties that
may be involved with distinguishing between the utilitarian, aesthetic, and
source identifying aspects of a product's design).
233. See id.
234. See supra Part I.B (describing the statutory requirements for
patentability).
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courts may be able to grant trade dress protection to qualifying
product configurations, under the limited circumstances of the
proposed standard, without improperly intruding on the patent
law.
It must also be asked whether a policy in favor of copying
unpatented product features outweighs, in all cases, protecting
a feature that functions to designate source.  Protection of a
product feature that is likely to indicate source to consumers
may have benefits that outweigh any negative effects on
competition.  This is because protecting a source designating
product configuration may prevent customer confusion and
increase the incentive for manufacturers to invest in their
products if they know that the goodwill they create with these
products will not be compromised by imitators.  Allowing
trademark protection in these cases would also take into
account the Supreme Court's concern in Two Pesos with
protecting the ability of small businesses to protect their source
identifying trade dress from first use without the burden of
developing and showing secondary meaning.235
Even with the difficulties in applying this test, it calls for a
deeper analysis into the manner in which a certain product
feature is likely to be perceived by consumers.  This analysis
may produce results that comport with the purposes of
trademark law more than those standards affording overly
broad or extremely restrictive protection to product
configurations.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ashley Furniture expresses
a liberal policy toward granting trade dress protection to
product configurations produced by a broad reading of the
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc.  The Fourth Circuit's holding is an especially telling
example of the inappropriateness of applying the traditional
Abercrombie classifications and a presumption of source
identifying ability to product configurations.  The resulting
breadth of protection afforded to product configurations
increases the chance that configurations not serving as
designators of source will receive trade dress protection and
avoid the rigors of design patent law.  The protection of product
235. See supra Part I.C.1.
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configurations that do not designate source is in conflict with
the basic purposes of the Lanham Act.
Decisions of the First, Second, and Third Circuits properly
express policies designed to avoid these conflicts.  Nevertheless,
these policies, seeking to predict a configuration's source
identifying ability, are so restrictive that they may deny trade
dress protection when it would serve to maintain the goodwill
of a business and prevent customer confusion.  This too is in
conflict with the basic purpose of the trademark law.
An appropriate test for inherent distinctiveness must seek
to fulfill these purposes by in-depth analysis into the functions
a product feature is likely to serve.  Application of the
Abercrombie classifications to product configurations avoids
this stringent analysis.  Without such analysis, courts may
unwittingly make mistakes as to source identifying ability and
allow designers to improperly use the Lanham Act to exclude or
hamper their competitors.
